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We analyze households' joint investment decisions for nancial wealth and homes.
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or transaction costs are captured by a threshold that has to be passed before the
purchase. The model allows for spill{over eects of a binding threshold for one asset
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nd that tenure choice a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1 Introduction
Housing wealth is the most important asset in households' portfolios, both for homeowners
and in total, across all age groups and in many countries.1 Together with nancial assets
it forms the biggest group within bequeathable wealth. In this paper we investigate how
the investment decisions for housing and nancial wealth of households are interrelated.
This relationship is an important one to understand for various reasons: First of all, it
might be the case that saving behavior of home owners diers from that for renters, and
thus the home ownership rate might have implications for the aggregate saving rate as
well. Moreover, house price developments will have not only an impact on the demand for
housing but also aect nancial wealth holdings; for instance, as has been stressed in the
recent literature, down payment constraints can inuence renters' decisions to save. But
there is no reason to expect a one way causal relationship | nancial and housing wealth
are the joint outcomes of one decision process, and are therefore jointly determined. In
this paper, we therefore allow for a simultaneous choice of investments. Clearly, as a
substantial part of the wealth of home owners is held in the form of housing wealth, the
home ownership decision and the amount of housing wealth will have an impact on the
level and the structure of nancial assets. Moreover, changes in returns to housing wealth
or restrictions in the housing market may lead to spill{over eects on nancial wealth
holdings, but just as well, changes in the nancial wealth market may aect the housing
wealth decisions.
This shows that the two decisions should be modeled simultaneously. Theoretical
models of this nature have been around since Henderson and Ioannides (1983). But in the
empirical literature on household portfolio choice and home ownership and housing wealth,
the joint nature of the decision has, to our knowledge, never been modeled explicitly.2
Analyzing a Dutch cross section data set drawn in 1988, we develop an empirical mod-
el explaining the joint determination of housing investment demand and nancial wealth
holdings. The model relates to the empirical literature on household portfolio choice.3
More than half of the households in our sample are renters and thus do not hold any
housing wealth. Also, many households report not to hold any nancial wealth. We
explicitly account for these zero nancial and housing asset holdings in the economet-
ric model. Hence, the model distinguishes several regimes, according to whether asset
amounts are zero or not. It is similar to the demand system of Lee and Pitt (1986), which
1See, among others, Alessie et al. (1995) for the Netherlands, Banks and Blundell (1995) for the UK,
Kessler and Wol (1991) for France and the US, and Wol (1994) for the US.
2Most of the empirical literature on housing focuses on consumption of housing services, and neglects
the investment aspect. Papers which do consider housing investment usually treat it in isolation of
other investment possibilities. An exception is Ioannides (1989), where housing wealth related variables
are explained from non{housing wealth variables and vice versa, but without taking account of the
endogeneity in either case.
3See, for instance, King and Leape (1987) or Ioannides (1989).
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is characterized by dierent demand functions for each commodity, for the case that non-
negativity constraints on demands for other commodities are binding or not. Here we
allow for dierences between the demand for nancial wealth between home owners and
renters, and between the demand for housing wealth of those who do and those who do
not hold nancial wealth. Endogeneity of the regime choice is accounted for by analyzing
the bivariate model as a whole.
While the model of Lee and Pitt (1986) explains zero amounts from non{negativity
constraints only, we allow for household specic thresholds which can be seen as minimum
amounts of assets held. If the optimal amount is lower than the threshold, the amount
actually held will be zero. The thresholds can be interpreted as reecting xed (transac-
tion) costs. We estimate the model separately for gross asset amounts and for equity, i.e.
amounts net of debts.
The relation between nancial and housing wealth has gained attention in the recent
literature to assess the relevance of down payment constraints for households' saving
behavior (Engelhardt (1994, 1996), Haurin et al. (1996) and Sheiner (1995)). It has been
argued that due to such constraints higher house prices induce those households who
have a desire to own a house to save more in the year(s) prior to homebuying in order to
meet that down payment constraint. Our ndings do not support this, which may reect
the absence of eective down payment constraints in the Netherlands: our estimated age
polynomial implies that the prime home{buying years are roughly between 20 and 40
of age. Comparing age patterns for home ownership and nancial wealth holdings, we
nd no evidence that younger households hold high amounts of nancial wealth at ages
before they typically would buy a home. We also nd that renters possess fewer nancial
resources than homeowners. As house prices rise, nancial wealth holdings of renters
decrease (while the number of renters increases). If renters were saving to buy a house,
we would expect the reverse relation.
The interaction eects in the model imply that the demand for nancial wealth of
home owners diers signicantly from that of renters. Simulations show that lowering
the threshold for housing wealth, which can be interpreted as liberalizing the mortgage
market, decreases the nancial wealth ownership rate but increases the level of nancial
wealth, conditional upon ownership. Again, the saving for the down payment story cannot
explain this. First, it would imply that lower thresholds would lead to higher nancial
wealth ownership rates since fewer people are discouraged from accumulating nancial
assets for buying a house in the future. Second, for those who do accumulate nancial
assets, the required level would decrease instead of increase.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey sketch the
organization of the Dutch housing market, which diers substantially from that in other
countries. In Section 3 we summarize our data and present some simple estimates showing
that asset holdings of home owners dier substantially from those of renters, even after
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controlling for wealth and other variables. Section 4 sketches a theoretical model for the
joint determination of nancial and housing investment along the lines of Henderson and
Ioannides (1983). We introduce our empirical model in Section 5. Results are presented
in Section 6. Section 7 discusses model implications as estimated parameter values are
changed. Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional Settings: the Housing Market in the
Netherlands
The housing market in the Netherlands is characterized by a large fraction of renters, most
of whom live in rent{regulated housing. In international perspective, the homeownership
rate is comparatively low. In 1990, about 45% of all households lived in their own home,
compared to an EC average of 62%,4 and 64% in the US.5 The owner{occupied sector
increased considerably during the last decade. Main supplier of rental accommodation
is the non{prot sector with a share of 77%. Private ownership of rental housing is
frequently indirect via institutional investors (43% of privately owned rental dwellings).
Only 13% of all rental dwellings are directly owned by private persons.
The housing market is strongly inuenced by government policy, both directly in terms
of provision of dwellings via municipal housing associations, and indirectly via incen-
tives schemes (taxation and subsidies). Dwellings built by municipal housing associations
served to buer uctuations in the private market. In the past decade, however, housing
associations have become more independent or were privatized, and subsidies have been
cut back (see Van der Krabben (1995) on this issue and for a recent survey of the structure
of the Dutch housing market).
The large share of housing wealth in owner{occupiers' bequeathable wealth implies
that the overall wealth position of owners depends critically on house prices. Both cap-
ital appreciation and depreciation can be substantial (Poterba (1991), Holmans (1994)).
Figure 1 shows that average real house prices in the period 1965{1990 in the Netherlands
have been quite volatile. Between 1976 and 1978 they surged by 52%. and fell by 38%
from 1979 to 1982. They remained at a low level until 1985 and have been increasing
since 1986.6
41991; average of home ownership rates in 12 EC countries (excl. former East Germany), weighted by
total dwelling stock; source: European Commission.
51989; cf. Holmans (1994).
6Mankiw and Weil (1989, with discussion) have initiated a debate in the U.S. literature, focusing on
the question whether house prices are forecastable from overall demographic trends and whether these
changes are in fact anticipated by current homeowners (cf. also Poterba (1991), and Hoynes andMcFadden
(1994)). This is particularly relevant in the presence of volatile house prices. House price changes might
to some extent be forecastable from long{run demographic developments, and yet households might not
re{adjust their portfolios and rather not downsize their housing wealth when they age. If this is the case,
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gure 1 about here
An important determinant of housing demand and of house prices is the development
of household size and composition. Individual demand for housing (persons per room)
tends to increase over time,7 and average household size is shrinking (inhabitants per
dwelling; see gure 2). According to CBS (1994), the number of households will rise
one{and{a{half times as fast as the number of inhabitants in the country in the next two
decades. 70% of this increase is accounted for by the expected rise in the number of single
person households.
gure 2 about here
House prices are aected by construction costs and after{tax costs of home ownership
(Poterba (1991)). Building costs for dwellings have risen sharply in the 1980s. One
of the reasons was the comparatively low rate of technological progress in the home
building sector. In addition, rising environmental concerns which will raise the costs of
land development are likely to become of importance (Van der Krabben (1995)).
There are no explicit down payment constraints in the Netherlands. Prospective home
owners can obtain a mortgage loan covering 100% of the value of the house. Obtaining
a mortgage loan is eectively restricted due to an income rule (determining the max-
imum debt servicing) and a wealth rule (determining the overall size of the mortgage
loan). Home ownership is therefore positively related to income and the level of nancial
resources. Mortgage interest rates were at a minimum in 1988. In the same year, the
number of newly registered mortgages reached a maximum (Van der Krabben (1995)).
User costs of homeownership depend also on the marginal tax rate faced by the house-
hold and on subsidies. The Netherlands have a progressive, broad{based income tax
system. The marginal rate in 1988 as a function of taxable income is piece{wise constant
in nine brackets. In addition there is a tax{free allowance depending on household com-
position. Capital gains (both realized and unrealized) are tax{exempt. Interest paid on
mortgages and consumer credits is deductible from the income tax base. Since the return
on housing as an asset mainly takes the form of capital gains, the tax rules make it at-
tractive to invest in housing for households with a high marginal income tax rate. Apart
from the income tax, there is a tax on housing property of about 0.28% of the value of the
house per year on average, and a tax of 0.8% on nancial and housing wealth exceeding
D. 95,000 for singles or D. 120,000 for couples.8 In addition, there are tax{free amounts
the question for current homeowners is whether they possess sucient other nancial resources to sustain
their consumption level in old age if prices drop. The static nature of our analysis implies that we cannot
explicitly address these features of the relation between nancial and housing wealth.
7CBS (1995) publishes six numbers for the postwar period: 1947: 0.90, 1956: 0.80, 1971: 0.64, 1981:
0.57, 1985: 0.54, 1989: 0.51 persons per room.
8Only 60% of owner occupied housing wealth is taken into account.
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on interest from savings and on dividend income (D. 1000 each for individuals; D. 2000
each for couples). Low income households have preferential access to the regulated rental
sector and can benet from subsidies.9
3 Data
The micro data we use in the analysis stem from a survey conducted in 1988 by a group
of Dutch banks (Dutch Collective Bank Study, CBO). It comprises 10113 individuals
in 3704 households. The survey is targeted at the nancial structure of household and
individual wealth and at the relationships between consumers and banks or other nancial
intermediaries. It is designed to be representative of the Dutch population in terms
of socio{demographic characteristics. It appears to suer from underreporting on asset
amounts, as other household surveys. Yet, it resembles national gures on nancial wealth
better than comparable Dutch sources, in particular with respect to ownership rates (see
Alessie et al. (1993)).
Questions were asked regarding ownership of single asset units, and conditional on
ownership, amounts were asked. While nearly all households provided complete infor-
mation on ownership, information regarding the amounts is often missing (see Table 3
below). Respondents were the head of household and other household members aged
18 and above. Since this paper deals with the structure of wealth on household level,
the individual responses were aggregated by summing over all assets within each asset
category and over all respondents per household. Due to either missing values or severe
outliers in the explanatory variable on net monthly income, we had to discard 627 obser-
vations. Comparing statistics of the remaining 3077 observations with those from the full
sample suggests that selection bias due to unobserved income is not a serious problem.
The marginal income tax rate is constructed from income, family composition, and labor
market status variables. Other background variables pertain to age and family structure,
employment status, and a regional house price index. The latter is based on average re-
gional selling prices of houses, provided by the Dutch Association of Real Estate Agents.
We dierentiated according to the type of dwelling and divided the regional prices by
national averages.10 An overview of the explanatory variables is given in Table 1.
table 1 about here
The questionnaire comprises detailed information on general nancial behavior, saving
accounts, checking accounts and credit cards, stocks, bonds, loans, mortgages, and insur-
ances. Only information on transferable wealth has been requested. Pension and social
9see Koning (1995) for an analysis of rent{allowances and housing demand.
10Polinsky (1977) criticizes using regional or metropolitan price information and points at potential
biases for estimated elasticities due to neglecting intraregional price variation. Empirically this criticism
has found little support, however (cf. Polinsky (1979) and Polinsky and Ellwood (1979)).
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security wealth cannot be recovered from the data. Moreover, there is no direct informa-
tion on amounts in checking account balances, capital accumulation in life insurances, or
values of major durables. Thus, total household wealth is not directly observable.
As far as housing wealth and housing consumption are concerned, we do not observe
variables related to the quality or location of one's home. We can also not distinguish in
our data between owner occupiers and landlords and have no information on rents paid
by tenants or rental income received by landlords. These limitations lead us to focus on
the portfolio allocation aspect rather than model housing consumption.
Housing equity is constructed as the dierence between the self{reported value of the
home and the outstanding mortgage debt. House values have been truncated from below
at D. 10,000 (set to missing otherwise); mortgages are truncated from below at D.
100. For some types of mortgage, an outstanding debt was imputed using other mortgage
information (127 observations).11 Some negative values of housing equity were set to
missing since they seemed implausibly high.12
For nancial wealth we similarly consider nancial assets and nancial equity (nancial
assets net of liabilities; the latter excluding mortgage debt). Financial assets comprise
saving accounts, time deposit accounts, saving certicates and certicates of deposit,
shares in domestic and foreign companies, shares in investment funds, options, bonds, and
mortgage bonds. To construct the equity variable, we subtracted the amount of liabilities.
15.7% of all households in the sample have nancial debt as well as a positive amount on
their saving account. Only 3.2% have nancial debt and zero holdings in nancial assets.
Holding nancial assets and liabilities is virtually uncorrelated (correlation coecient of
{0.012). Only 6.3% of all households hold stocks or bonds, most of them in combination
with other, saving related assets.
Table 2 contains summary statistics of nancial and housing wealth and equity (miss-
ing values excluded). The means suggest that housing wealth is more important for the
aggregate composition of wealth than nancial assets, in spite of the higher ownership
rate for the latter. The distribution of nancial assets is strongly skewed to the right.
This suggests that a log transformation may be helpful to obtain an empirical model (with
normally distributed errors) that ts the data. We shall come back to this in Section 6.
11This concerns life insurance and improved life insurance mortgages. For the former, the principal
debt is paid o only at the end of the contract with the accumulated capital in a life insurance, without a
close link between the life insurance capital and the mortgage debt. For the latter, the link is much closer,
and the interest rate paid on the mortgage equals the interest rate received on accumulated capital. For
both types the term `outstanding mortgage debt' is strictly speaking not applicable. We imputed it from
the data on principal, interest rate, and year of begin of the mortgage contract, under the assumption of
a xed interest rate (self reported) and a typical total pay{o period of 30 years. In this way, the amount
of outstanding debt could be recovered for 127 out of 231 cases of this mortgage type. The remainder
was set to missing.
12121 observations where the initial mortgage is more than 20% higher than the current value of the
house.
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table 2 about here
Nonparametric density estimates of the marginal distribution of the log transformed13
endogenous variables on housing and nancial wealth, excluding zero{observations, are
provided in gure 3. While the distributions of the wealth variables are not far from
normal, those of the equity variables are of a bimodal nature, with a large positive and a
small negative mode.
gure 3 about here
Table 3 provides an overview of the numbers of positive, zero, and missing amounts for
the wealth and equity variables. 88% of the households hold housing or nancial wealth,
84% hold nancial assets, 48% invest in residential real estate, 44% in both. For 19.6%
of homeowners and 14.2% of nancial equity owners, the amount is not observed. The
numbers of missings are substantial, and ignoring them may seriously bias the results.
We take account of this in the model in Section 5.
tables 3a/b about here
Figure 4 shows ownership rates as a function of age of the head of the household for
nancial assets, liabilities, homes, and mortgages.14 The home ownership rate is highest
in the age group 30 to 40. In this age class, almost all home owners also have a mortgage.
Elderly households are less likely to hold mortgage debt, whereas home{ownership is still
common. Old age groups do not seem to have completely liquidized housing equity.15
Similarly, ownership of nancial assets is frequent for all age groups, whereas the nancial
debt rate peaks at age 40 and is low for the elderly.
gure 4 about here
Figure 5 shows kernel regression estimates on age of the total value of the home, the
total value of nancial assets, home equity (ie. net of mortgages), and nancial equity
13To be precise, throughout the paper we use the following sign preserving log transformation:
x 7! g(x) =
(
log(x + 1) if x  0
  log( x + 1) if x < 0:
14The dots are the ownership rates for each separate age; the curves are obtained by smoothing these
non{parametrically. The number of observations for advanced age groups is small; the non{parametric
smoothers do not take account of this.
15We do not compare the same people over time as they age, but compare dierent cohorts at one
point in time. The patterns reported here therefore do not necessarily reect life cycle eects. Sheiner
and Weil (1992) take account of cohort eects and nd that 42% of households leave behind a house
when they die.
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(assets net of liabilities).16 For the sample as a whole, housing wealth is hump{shaped
with a maximum at age 45. In spite of this, the age pattern of housing is more or less
at for higher ages, corresponding to falling mortgage debts. The age patterns of housing
wealth and equity of those with nancial debts deviate substantially from those for the
whole sample. Financial wealth and nancial equity increase with age. In particular,
older homeowners hold a sizable amount of nancial wealth, as opposed to renters.17
Among those with nancial liabilities, older households have a positive nancial equity
position, indicating that they hold nancial assets at the same time. Interesting as well
is the apparent absence of saving for a down payment: we neither observe that young
renters hold particularly high levels of nancial wealth, nor that young homeowners hold
comparatively low levels of nancial assets.
gure 5 about here
Are homeowners dierent? Is the portfolio behavior of households who owner occupy
dierent from that of renters, given total wealth? To answer this question, we estimate
some (univariate) probit equations for ownership of various types of assets and debts,
conditioning on home ownership, total wealth,18 and some background variables. The
asset types considered are short term savings (saving accounts), long term savings (time
deposit accounts, saving certicates & certicates of deposit), life insurance contracts,19
and stocks or bonds (shares in domestic and foreign companies, shares in investment
funds, options, bonds and mortgage bonds). In addition, we model the number of assets
held as ordinal probits, both including and excluding nancial debt.20
table 4 about here
The estimates are displayed in Table 4. Homeowners tend to hold signicantly more
types of nancial assets than renters, even after controlling for wealth and other charac-
teristics. The homeownership dummy is signicantly positive in most of the ownership
equations, signicantly negative in the equation for short term savings, and insignicant
only in the stocks and bonds equation. Compared to that of renters, homeowners' invest-
ment behavior thus seems to be directed towards the long run. Given wealth, households
16Observations with zero holdings of the assets are included in the regressions. Excluded are observa-
tions for which the amount is missing.
17The age pattern for renters displays a minimum at around 47 and a maximum around 60. The
standard errors are rather high, however; moreover, notice the scale in the picture.
18We replaced missing values of the total wealth variable by their predictions; otherwise, too many
observations would have been lost to estimate the equations for long term savings.
19For life insurances we have the information on ownership, but not on amounts.
20The structure of household wealth on this aggregation level is as follows: disregarding nancial debt,
43% of the 3077 households hold one and 40% hold two of the 4 nancial asset types while 11% hold
none; including nancial debt, 9% hold none, 38% hold one, and 37% hold two of these types.
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are free to choose whether they want to invest in housing or not. Therefore, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the two types of wealth are jointly determined, implying that the
conditional regressions in Table 4 do not have structural interpretation. In the remainder
of the paper we will therefore focus on setting up and estimating a model for the joint
determination of investment in both assets.
4 The Decision Framework
To illustrate the nature of the economic decisions to be taken and to motivate how vari-
ables like house prices, tax rates, etc. play a role, we present a theoretical model for
investment in housing and nancial assets similar to that of Henderson and Ioannides
(1983). We will also explain why this model cannot be used as the basis of a structural
empirical model.
Assume that a representative household maximizes utility over two periods, `present'
and `future', and derives utility from housing h and non{housing goods c. In the current
period, the realizations of random variables are known. The household can invest its
savings in housing wealth H or nancial assets F .21 It can also nance part of its housing
wealth by a mortgage loan L. Part of the housing stock corresponding to housing wealth
can be owner occupiedHo, the remainder can be let to others H Ho. Thus the household
maximizes
U(c; h) + EV (W1) (1)
subject to the constraints
h = roHo + hr (2)
F = Y0 +W0  H + L   p
cc  prhr (3)
W1 = Y1 + (1 + r
f )F + (1 + rh)H   (1 + rL)L+ rl(H  Ho) (4)
Here, V denotes the value function in period 1, which depends onW1, wealth in period
1. ro is the rate at which, in period 0, owner occupied housing wealth is transformed
into housing services. It depends negatively on house prices. hr denotes rented housing
services, with price pr per unit. Variation in pr is smaller than in house prices, because the
renting market is largely regulated. pr can also be aected by rent subsidies (see section
2). pc denotes the price of consumption. W0, Y0 and Y1 are initial wealth and non{asset
income in periods 0 and 1, respectively. rf and rh are the net returns to nancial assets
and housing wealth, respectively. They are aected by the tax system and by house price
changes. rL is the after tax interest rate on the mortgage.22 rl is the net rent received
21Brueckner (1995) generalizes the model to allow for a dierentiated portfolio choice in nancial assets.
22In the Netherlands there is no reason to expect that rL and rf are the same. For example, mortgage
contracts usually have a xed interest rates for ten or more years, while rf , if xed at all, will be xed
for much shorter periods.
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per unit. At t = 0, rf , rh, and Y1 will be uncertain. Moreover, indirect period 1 utility V
can also depend upon other variables which are uncertain in period 0, such as prices of
consumption and housing services.
Various inequality constraints should be satised as well:
L  H (5)
Ho  0 (6)
H  0 (7)
F  0 (8)
The rst constraint assigns a maximum mortgage, which is some fraction of the value of
housing.  will usually be around one.23 The nal constraint reects liquidity constraints.
To allow for people with nancial debts, it could be relaxed. An explanation for zero
nancial wealth holdings can then be that rf is larger if F < 0 than if F > 0.
Henderson and Ioannides (1983) also assume that hr = 0 ifH > 0, since families cannot
rent part of their house and buy another part. They focus on the moral hazard problem
due to the principal{agent relationship between landlords and tenants. This prevents
landlords to charge a rent which equals the full costs of utilization (which depends on
the tenant's behavior) to the renter. This renting externality makes it unattractive to let
(H > Ho) and rent simultaneously.
Prices, tax rules, interest rates, etc. enter this type of model in various ways. For
dierent versions of the model, various authors have looked at comparative statics. In
principle, for a given functional form and given details of the tax system etc., the model can
be solved. Many complications arise, however, if it is to be used to construct a structural
empirical model: the time periods are not well dened, initial wealth, future income,
(expected) returns are unobserved, the tax rules are complicated and lead to nonconvex
budget sets, etc. Moreover, in our data the distinction between Ho and H  Ho is not
clear and hr is not observed. Furthermore, the model does not allow for xed costs of
house ownership, while in empirical models it appears to be important to disentangle the
ownership from the amount decision. Therefore, our empirical model in the next section
is simplied in that it focuses on the bivariate nature of the nancial decision making
process and takes some account of price and tax rate variation, but does not incorporate
the full structure of the theoretical model.
5 Empirical Model
The empirical model allows for joint determination of nancial and housing wealth. The
asset demands are derived analogously to demand equations in a commodity demand
23There are no explicit down payment constraints in the Netherlands.  will also depend on income,
and rL can depend on .
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system. We allow rst explicitly for the existence of non{negativity constraints which will
possibly trigger spill{over eects on the demand for other assets. To illustrate the way
in which those non{negativity constraints and spill{over eects are introduced, consider
notional and conditional demand equations derived from Stone{Geary preferences for the
case of three goods: Notional demand equations are those of the linear expenditure system
(LES), with expenditures on good i given by24
piq





Here qi is the quantity and pi the price of good i. W is the given total budget and i and
i are parameters. In our case, p1q1 corresponds to housing wealth and p2q2 to nancial
wealth. For p1 we use a regional house price index, p2 is normalized to one. The third
argument (p3q3) remains unspecied. In terms of the two period model in the previous
section, we can think of W as the sum of initial wealth and income in period 1, and of p3q3
as consumption expenditures in period 1. p3q3 may also include investment in durables
or other assets not included in nancial or housing wealth, however.
Conditional demand equations for good i (denoted ~qi; i = 1; 2) are derived for the case
where non{negativity constraints on one or more of the other goods are binding. For
convenience, we assume that there is no binding non{negativity constraint for q3. Four
possible regimes can now be distinguished, according to whether nonnegativity constraints
on goods 1 and 2 are binding or not. Suppose the constraint for good 1 is binding, implying
that its notional demand is negative and its eective demand is zero. Then the relevant
demand equation for good 2 will be the conditional (~q2) instead of the notional demand
(q2):
p2~q2 = p22 + 2=(1   1)(W   p22): (10)
Using the short{hand notation 2  2=(1 1), (10) can be written as a linear combination






The conditional demand for good 1 if the nonnegativity constraint for good 2 is binding
can be derived in the same way. Expressed in terms of shadow prices, this means that the
shadow price of a rationed asset is lower than its market price. 2 > 0 implies a negative
spill{over eect of the non{negativity constraint. Due to its parameter restrictions, LES
only allows for negative spill{over eects, i.e. for substitutes (2 > 0, because LES imposes
2 > 0 and 1 < 1).
A generalization of the model with non{negativity constraints can be obtained by
incorporating stochastic censoring threshold equations reecting individual hurdles which
have to be crossed before a purchase is made (see Nelson (1977) for the univariate case).
24For notational convenience we do not carry through a household index in the derivation of the model.
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Such thresholds can reect minimum purchase requirements or xed transaction costs,
for instance.25 Apart from costs which are linked to the purchase of a home (search costs,
legal costs, real estate agent fees and other duties), xed costs of moving will contribute
to the illiquidity of housing wealth. These costs also comprise a psychological component
which may depend upon age and other household characteristics. Positive thresholds
imply that, once a purchase is made, some minimum amount is bought.
The complete econometricmodel with thresholds is as follows. We rst specify notional





i = xi + i (i = 1; 2) (12)
T i = xi + ui (i = 1; 2) (13)
where x is a vector of regressors, including variables which determine the budget (or, in
our case, initial wealth and income) and prices. 26 The error terms i and ui account for
unobserved heterogeneity.
Conditional demands are then dened by (11) and its analogue for good 1. The












It is not intuitively clear why the same 1 and 2 must be used here as in (11). For





2 . In the appendix we show that
this generally leads to an incoherent model, i.e. to a model that is not well-dened in the
sense that endogenous variables are not uniquely determined for given values of exogenous
variables and error terms (see Heckman (1978), for example). Thus specication (14) is
motivated by both computational convenience and the requirement of coherency.





and ~Si = pi~qi   ~Ti; (i = 1; 2). The selection equations can be written as












25Incorporating these explicitly in the LES demand system would require comparing values of the
direct utility functions. This leads to non{linear equations and an intractible stochastic specication,
from which we are not able to derive empirically tractable expressions.
26Since total household wealth W is unobservable due to missing wealth components (life insurances,
checking accounts, private pension and social security wealth) we cannot include the total budget itself.
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The regime allocation is given by
(a) S1 > 0; S

2 > 0 :
p1q1 = p1q

1; p2q2 = p2q

2
(b) ~S1 > 0; S

2 < 0 :




2; p2q2 = 0
(c) S1 < 0;
~S2 > 0 :





(d) ~S1 < 0; ~S2 < 0 :
p1q1 = 0; p2q2 = 0:
(16)
Regimes (a)   (d) correspond to the entries in Table 3. The complete empirical model
is thus given by (11), (12), (15), and (16). The model reduces to the model with non{
negativity constraints if (with probability one) Si = piq

i (i = 1; 2). Unlike the model
with non{negativity constraints only, our specication allows for separation of the own-
ership and the investment decision. This is important since, for example, it has been
claimed that higher house prices decrease the tendency to own but at the same time
raise the housing wealth for households conditional on having chosen to own (see Haurin
et al. (1996)). Similarly, the discrete ownership decision and the conditional continuous
investment decision for nancial wealth are disentangled.
We assume that the four error terms in the model are jointly normal and independent
of the regressors. The variances of 1 and 2 are normalized to 1. The general model
with a full covariance matrix is only identied due to functional form and distributional
assumptions. Exclusion restrictions on the notional demand equations are hard to justify
from an economic point of view. Therefore we set the correlation coecients between
selection equations and demand equations to zero. This implies that the demand equations
should be interpreted as conditional demand equations, given that the amount is non{
zero. Since latent demand for households who do not buy the asset is irrelevant anyhow,
this is not as restrictive as it may seem.27
According to the LES specication, 1 and 2 should both be nonnegative (and
12  1). Negative values are not compatible with Stone{Geary preferences. Our
empirical model, however, can still remain valid if 1 < 0 or 2 < 0. It exploits the LES
framework only partially, because the budget is not observed and p2 does not vary across
the sample. The empirical model will therefore also be compatible with other, more exi-
ble systems than LES. In particular, such an alternative demand system could also allow
for complements and negative values of 1 and 2. We therefore do not impose that 1
27Melenberg and Van Soest (1996) explain this in detail for the univariate selection model.
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and 2 are positive.
On the other hand, we have to guarantee that the empirical model is coherent. In the
appendix we show that coherency is guaranteed i 12  1. This is weaker than the
constraint 1  0, 2  0 and 12  1 implied by LES. If the coherency conditions are
satised but the LES inequalities are not, the LES interpretation is lost but the empirical
model still makes sense.
6 Empirical Results
We separately consider the model for wealth and equity variables. Estimation is by Max-
imum Likelihood. We take full account of observations with missing amount information
for endogenous variables. For each asset, we distinguish three cases: the amount is zero,
the amount is nonzero and observed, or the amount is nonzero and unobserved. This lead-
s to nine regimes in the likelihood (see Table 3). We assume that, conditional on being
nonzero, observability of the amount is independent of the error terms in the model. This
allows us to estimate the model without explicitly estimating equations for observability.
Since the model does not describe structural economic relationships as outlined in
Section 4 we do not have strong a priori reasons to prefer a specication where dependent
variables are measured in currency units over a specication with a log transformation.
Instead, we select the specication which gives the best t to the data. For this purpose,
we use tests for non{nested models as proposed by Vuong (1989). These lead to the
conclusion that the specication in logs is better, for the gross asset as well as the equity
variables.28
Results for the models in logs are presented in Tables 5a (wealth) and 6a (equity). We
set all cross{correlations between the selection part and the demand equations to zero.
Joint LM tests on these four constraints (ij = 0; i; j = 1; 2) do not reject the null at
the 5% level.
table 5a about here
We rst discuss the results for wealth in Table 5a. The eect of income in the demand
equations is captured by a quadratic function. Estimates are insignicant except in the
28We consider the case of two strictly non{nested models, i.e. models that do not coincide for any
parameter values. To make the specications comparable, the Jacobian of the log transformation is taken
into account. The Vuong tests then test the Null that both models are equivalent versus the hypotheses
that one model is closer to the true but unknown data generating process than the other. The test
statistics are asymptotically standard normal under the Null and are given by T1 = n 1=2LRn=b!n and
T2 = n
 1=2LRn=e!n where e!2n = 1=nPLR2i , b!2n = e!2n   (1=nLRn)2; n denotes sample size, LRi the
log likelihood ratio for observation i between both alternative models evaluated at the estimates, and
LRn =
P
LRi. For our application, comparing the specication in levels against the log specication,
we obtain for the cases with gross wealth T1 =  20:11, T2 =  18:91, and for the cases with equity
T1 =  3:41 and T2 =  3:41.
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selection equation for housing where we nd a u{shaped pattern. The marginal tax rate
has a strong positive and signicant impact on holding both nancial and housing wealth,
both in the selection equations and in the demand equations. This reects the tax favored
status of these assets.
The estimated age polynomial for housing wealth is signicant for the selection part,
implying that the prime home{buying years are roughly between 20 and 40 of age. 29
This is consistent with the pattern in gure 4. Houseowners' wealth held in housing is not
signicantly inuenced by the age of the head of the household, though. Financial assets
do not depend on age either | the conditional demand of nancial wealth rises with
age but the parameter estimates are not signicant. Comparing age patterns for home
ownership and nancial wealth holdings, we nd no evidence that younger households
hold high amounts of nancial wealth at ages before they typically would buy a home.
This may reect the absence of eective down payment constraints.
As expected, the probability of homeownership is signicantly lower in regions where
housing prices are higher. On the other hand, conditional on ownership, the amount
invested in housing increases with the price of the house. This is in line with the ndings of
Haurin et al. (1996). One interpretation is that households are discouraged from investing
in houses where house prices are high, but once they have chosen to do so, they will invest
more. The housing price has a signicant negative impact on holding nancial wealth.
Conditional upon holding nancial wealth however, the eect of the housing price on the
amount held is positive but insignicant at the 5 percent level.
Apart from the impact of housing prices, our model also allows for an interaction
between the two assets through the parameters 1 and 2, which refer to the impact of
binding thresholds (equation (11)). While 1 is virtually identical to zero, 2 is signi-
cantly negative. This would imply that the two assets are complements in the Hicksian
sense, and this nding is incompatible with the LES specication (9). On the other hand,
the coherency condition for the empirical model is amply met. The estimates thus imply
that the restriction on nancial wealth does not aect the housing decision, whereas the
restriction on housing does matter for nancial wealth. Whether the conditional demand
for nancial wealth exceeds or falls short of the notional demand depends on the sign of the
notional demand for housing wealth. If this is positive, renters hold less nancial assets if
the housing threshold is binding than if it were not binding. Actual housing wealth is then
zero and therefore below its unrestricted optimal value, and nancial wealth will then also
below its notional optimum. Thus, in a sense, the two could be called complements. This
result is not in line with the idea that renters save for down payments.
29Alessie et al. (1995) using Dutch panel data and Banks and Blundell (1995) using a time series
of British cross{sections show that age eects must not be confounded with life cycle eects, since in
homeownership rates there is usually a strong cohort eect. These studies show that conditional on the
cohort, home ownership rates rise over time for all but the oldest age groups.
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Demographics and other socio{economic background variables are included for various
reasons. First, we have to proxy unobserved total household wealth, as outlined in section
4. Especially higher education, a full{time job (reference category), and marital status are
proxies for life{time wealth and also might indicate the inclination for timing and extent
of investment in housing wealth. Second, as outlined in section 2, we suspect demographic
variables to have a direct impact on housing demand. The estimates by and large conrm
our expectations based on other studies in the eld.
Finally, we nd signicant positive correlations between the error terms in the de-
mand equations for the two assets, and also between the error terms in the two selection
equations. This points at unobserved characteristics that aect both types of assets in
the same direction. Factors that determine life{time income or initial assets would be
obvious candidates for this, if they are not captured by current earnings and education.
table 6a about here
Table 6a contains the results on the equity holdings. Results for the selection equation
of housing equity are virtually identical to those in Table 5a. The conditional demand
for housing equity, however, diers substantially from the conditional demand for housing
assets. The marginal tax rate now has a negative sign. This means that it has a stronger
(positive) impact on the amount of mortgage than on the chosen value of the house. The
house price in the housing equity demand equation is insignicant. Apparently, higher
values of homes are compensated by higher mortgages, so that the eect on the net
investment is small. Estimates for the nancial equity ownership equation are similar
to those for nancial wealth ownership. For the nancial conditional demand equation,
estimates are also similar, but signicance levels in the equation for nancial equity are
lower than in the equation for gross nancial wealth.
The estimate of 2 is again signicantly negative, and the spill{over eect from housing
to nancial equity is larger than for the gross asset amounts (Table 5a). The estimate
of 1 remains zero, so that spill{over eects from nancial to housing equity cannot be
found. The strong positive correlations between the error terms have increased as well.
tables 5b/6b about here
Tables 5b and 6b show simulated averages and numbers of observations per regime30
for both models. Table 5b suggests that the t of the model to the data, and in particular
with respect to the regime choice, is rather good. This is partly attributable to the fact
that we work with variables in logs. The t is much better for gross wealth estimates than
for equity, as a comparison of tables 5b and 6b reveals. This may be related to the bimodal
30as explained above, we do not model the observability and thus do not distinguish subregimes within
(a)  (d).
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nature of the distribution of the equity variables, which we saw in Figure 3. In both cases
the predicted gures match the data much better than the corresponding estimates for
data in levels instead of logs (tables available upon request), which are characterized by
more skewed distributions. Splitting by income quintile (Tables 5c/6c) again leads to
the conclusion that the model ts the data reasonably well, particularly for gross assets.
For the equity variables there are some substantial deviations between conditional means
from the model and the data.
tables 5c/6c about here
7 Model Implications
In this section we analyze the model predictions for exogenous changes in the selection
mechanism and house prices. This is achieved by simulating the model and averaging
over both individuals and replications.
To show the relevance of the thresholds, we study the consequences of changing one
of the thresholds by the same percentage for each household. This comes about as a
change in the constant of the selection equation.31 We focus on the eects of lowering
thresholds, which can be interpreted as an exogenous relaxation of market or institutional
restrictions. One can think of the eects of nancial liberalization in the mortgage market
or the credit market, for instance.
table 7 about here
Table 7 considers ownership rates and conditional means when thresholds are varied
for the model with gross asset components. Changing the threshold for asset i has a strong
impact on the ownership rate of the same asset, while the eect on the conditional demand
of asset i is small. Lowering the threshold in the housing market by only 1% boosts
homeownership by 4.3% points to almost 53%. Conditional mean log house values decrease
only slightly. Again, we focus on the spill{over eect on nancial wealth ownership from
lowering the housing threshold. As the housing thresholds are lowered, nancial wealth
ownership is reduced slightly, while the conditional mean of those who own nancial
assets increases. The latter points at the complementarity we have found in the estimates
(2 < 0). Decreasing the threshold for nancial assets has an eect on nancial wealth
holdings, but the spill{over eect on home ownership is virtually zero
31Call the constants in the demand equation, threshold equation, and selection equation 0i; 0i; and
0i, respectively (i = 1; 2). Hence, 0i = 0i   0i. This implies that, keeping 0i constant, a change in
0i changes 0i by the same absolute amount but in the opposite direction. In the tables we show the
eects of a percentage change in 0i. Note that all the variables refer to the specication in logs, and not
in levels of the thresholds.
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table 8 about here
Table 8 shows the analogous results for the model estimated on equity data. The eect
of varying the housing threshold on home ownership rates is even more pronounced, since
mortgages can be substantial. Cross eects from varying the housing threshold on the
nancial equity ownership rate and the conditional demand for nancial assets have the
same sign as in Table 7. The eects are stronger than for the gross asset case.
tables 9/10 about here
Table 9 displays ownership rates and conditional means for the impact of a change in
house prices on gross assets. Table 10 shows corresponding results for equity. We consider
house price changes from  20% to +20% which are well in line with the historical pattern
documented in Section 2 and gure 1. As the results show, ownership rates and condi-
tional means of both assets are aected. The impact of prices on homeownership rates
is substantially negative, but is compensated by the positive impact on the conditional
mean of gross housing wealth. As a consequence, the impact on the unconditional mean
would be close to zero. Similarly, higher house prices reduce nancial assets ownership
rates while their eect on the conditional demand for nancial assets is positive. The
eects on the conditional demands are of opposite sign for the net variables compared to
the gross variables. This can indicate that houseowners are able to overcompensate price
changes by changes in mortgage contracts. As conditional nancial equity decreases with
house prices whereas conditional nancial assets increase, the role of nancial debts seems
to increase with house prices.
The tables also show nancial wealth holdings for renters, indicating that their -
nancial resources are much lower than those of homeowners. As house prices rise, the
conditional nancial wealth holdings of renters is decreased (while the number of renters
increases). Turning to equity we nd a similar eect of the house price variation on renter-
s' nancial assets. These results are in contradiction with the ndings of Sheiner (1995)
who reports young renters to have more assets in cities and regions with high house prices.
The low level of nancial resources of renters is compatible with the view that renters do
not have a desire for home owning and thus need not accumulate nancial resources prior
to ownership (cf. Haurin et al. (1996)). If down payment constraints were important,
one would expect renters to have saved more with increased house prices, unless they are
discouraged from home owning.
8 Conclusions
We have set up and estimated a bivariate censored regression model with endogenous
switching for household investment in bequeathable wealth, distinguishing the two most
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important asset types households invest in. Avoiding selectivity problems we estimate the
model on a representative sample of Dutch households, including both renters and owners
and both nancial asset holders and non{holders. The modeling of spill{over eects is
derived from a LES demand system. The empirical model, however, is more general than
LES, and avoids the implicit assumption of the LES that goods are substitutes. Our
parameter estimates do not satisfy the LES constraints.
The main nding is that demand for nancial wealth for home owners and for renters
is systematically dierent, while housing wealth is not aected by whether or not nancial
wealth is held. Consistent with previous studies in this eld is the nding that higher
regional house prices reduce the likelihood of homeownership. At the same time, housing
wealth of home owners responds positively to house price variation, whereas it does not
aect their housing equity. Higher house prices also decrease the probability of holding
nancial wealth, whereas they increase the conditional demand for nancial assets but
reduces conditional demand for nancial equity.
As has been widely discussed in the recent literature, down payment restrictions op-
erate as liquidity constraints and inuence households' saving behavior (cf. Engelhardt
(1994, 1996), Haurin et al. (1996), and Sheiner (1995)): both in Canada and in the
U.S. a down payment is specied as a percentage (usually in the range of 5{25%) of the
purchase price of the house, such that an increase in house prices can lead to a higher
down payment and thus can induce higher saving. On the other hand, if those increased
down payments are too high, renter households might become discouraged from buying
a house at all or be willing to only buy a smaller house to compensate for the increase
in down payments, or even to delay the date of home buying. A higher down payment
amount implies a greater intertemporal distortion of the consumption plan such that the
discounted benets of homeowning might fall short of the discounted costs of consumption
distortion (cf. Artle and Varaiya (1978) for a theoretical exposition). Thus, both timing
and extent of pre{ownership saving are aected. In the Netherlands however, the low
homeownership rate and the eective absence of down payment constraints imply that
liquidity constraints are not of major importance for Dutch households' saving behavior.
This presumption is corroborated by our empirical ndings.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of exogenous variables (3077 observations)a
Variable mean stddev. min max median
log(income+1) 7.735 0.672 0 11.495 7.75
log2(income+1) 60.279 9.338 0 132.126 60.01
marg. tax rate 0.473 0.133 0 0.72 0.51
age of head 43.992 15.455 18 89 40
age squared / 1000 2.174 1.520 0.324 7.921 1.6
age cubed / 10000 11.880 12.295 0.583 70.497 6.4
interm. education 0.328 0.469 0 1 0
high education 0.161 0.368 0 1 0
self{employed 0.103 0.304 0 1 0
white collar 0.447 0.497 0 1 0
blue collar 0.247 0.431 0 1 0
other occupation 0.204 0.403 0 1 0
full{time 0.596 0.491 0 1 1
part{time 0.049 0.216 0 1 0
other status 0.355 0.478 0 1 0
female 0.207 0.405 0 1 0
couples 0.690 0.463 0 1 1
divorced / widowed 0.167 0.373 0 1 0
no. children 0.964 1.116 0 8 1
house price index 0.972 0.154 0.626 1.230 0.98
aDenition of variables:
income: sum of net labor income (D/month) of head and partner; 7 households report zero income.
marginal tax rate: calculated from individual net earnings and family composition; the household rate
is set equal to the maximum of the two individual rates.
age, the number of children are self{explanatory; the remaining variables are dummies:
intermediate education: technical and vocational training for 16+ years old, and pre{university edu-
cation;
high education: university degree or higher vocational training.
Labor supply: part-time employment (10{35 hours per week); other status: disabled, unemployed,
retired, students and housewives/men without alternative occupation. The reference group is full-time
(36 hours per week or more).
Occupational status: self-employed (includes free lancers, directors or owners of rms, farmers or mar-
ket gardeners), whitecollar employees and other occupation (people without paid employment and
others); reference group are bluecollarworkers; couples: married or living together. The house price
index is based on average regional selling prices of houses, provided by the Dutch Association of Real
Estate Agents. We dierentiated according to the type of dwelling and divided the regional prices by
national averages.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of endogenous variablesa
Variable nobs. mean stddev. min max median skewn.
house value 3055 77.26E3 98.76E3 0 850.00E3 0 1.57
|, > 0 1469 160.67E3 82.95E3 10.00E3 850.00E3 145.00E3 2.36
logs 3055 5.707 5.942 0 13.653 0 0.09
|, > 0 1469 11.869 0.511 9.210 13.653 11.88 {1.08
n. assets 2743 16.48E3 70.36E3 0 1.41E6 3.00E3 11.54
|, > 0 2244 20.14E3 77.32E3 1 1.41E6 4.74E3 10.49
logs 2743 6.795 3.619 0 14.163 8.01 {0.94
|, > 0 2244 8.306 1.859 0.693 14.163 8.46 {0.54
house equity 2786 38.68E3 71.53E3 {28.00E3 806.73E3 0 3.07
|, 6= 0 1200 89.79E3 85.39E3 {28.00E3 806.73E3 70.00E3 2.31
logs 2786 4.326 5.725 {10.24 13.601 0 0.23
|, 6= 0 1200 10.044 4.318 {10.24 13.601 11.16 {3.73
n. equity 2697 14.64E3 71.77E3 {479.49E3 1.42E6 2.50E3 10.89
|, 6= 0 2298 17.19E3 77.48E3 {479.49E3 1.42E6 3.90E3 10.07
logs 2697 5.041 6.166 {13.080 14.163 7.82 {1.23
|, 6= 0 2298 5.917 6.281 {13.080 14.163 8.27 {1.70
aDenition of variables:
house value: gross housing wealth;
house equity: value of the house net of outstanding mortgage debt;
fin. assets: sum of the amounts held in saving account balances, time deposit accounts, saving cer-
ticates, certicates of deposit, shares in domestic and foreign companies, shares in investment funds,
options, bonds and mortgage bonds;
fin. equity: nancial assets net of liabilities;
`logs' means: log(x+1) for non{negative observations,   log( x+1) for negative observations, cf. fn. 13;
skewness is measured as skewness(x)  E(x  E(x))3=3, where 2 is the variance of x.
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Table 3: number of observations per regime
a value of the home vs. nancial assets
number of nancial assets nancial assets nancial assets sum
observations (%) > 0 (observed) > 0 (unobserved) = 0
value of the home regime (a) regime (b)
> 0 (observed) 1136 (36.92) 209 (6.79) 124 (4.03) 1469 (47.74)
value of the home
> 0 (unobserved) 12 (0.39) 7 (0.23) 3 (0.10) 22 (0.71)
value of the home regime (c) regime (d)
= 0 1096 (35.62) 118 (3.83) 372 (12.09) 1586 (51.54)
sum 2244 (72.93) 334 (10.85) 499 (16.22) 3077 (100.00)
b housing equity (net of mortgages) vs. nancial equity (net of liabilities)
number of nancial equity nancial equity nancial equity sum
observations (%) 6= 0 (observed) 6= 0 (unobserved) = 0
housing equity regime (a) regime (b)
6= 0 (observed) 949 (30.84) 182 (5.91) 69 (2.24) 1200 (39.00)
housing equity
6= 0 (unobserved) 209 (6.79) 50 (1.62) 32 (1.04) 291 (9.46)
housing equity regime (c) regime (d)
= 0 1140 (37.05) 148 (4.81) 298 (9.68) 1586 (51.54)
sum 2298 (74.68) 380 (12.35) 399 (12.97) 3077 (100.00)
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Table 4: ownership of asset types
(probit estimates)
nobs. 3077 short term long term life stocks or nancial number, inc. number, exc.
savings savings insurance bonds debt n. debt n. debt
home owner {1.107 1.210 0.195 0.154 0.367 0.440 0.414
({6.18) (10.29) (2.17) (1.14) (3.40) (6.03) (5.52)
log(wealth+1) 1.019 0.595 {0.003 0.149 0.001 0.468 0.561
(20.64) (7.06) ({0.11) (1.98) (0.05) (21.50) (23.73)
log2(wealth+1) {0.055 {0.050 0.001 {0.005 {0.007 {0.031 {0.035
({14.99) ({9.94) (0.43) ({1.00) ({2.80) ({16.74) ({17.79)
marg. 0.380 1.969 0.710 1.893 1.419 1.547 1.330
tax rate (0.87) (4.53) (2.64) (4.19) (4.44) (6.90) (5.72)
age {0.013 0.043 0.070 {0.026 0.066 0.038 0.035
({0.66) (2.19) (5.48) ({1.32) (3.94) (3.97) (3.47)
age2 / 1000 0.108 {0.251 {0.865 0.402 {0.883 {0.472 {0.388
(0.55) ({1.28) ({6.48) (2.00) ({4.85) ({4.79) ({3.79)
selfemployed or 0.097 0.820 {0.147 0.405 {0.225 0.101 0.200
farmer (0.61) (5.51) ({1.47) (2.23) ({1.93) (1.23) (2.33)
white collar 0.299 0.251 {0.149 0.316 0.103 0.065 0.015
(2.40) (2.00) ({2.11) (1.99) (1.30) (1.11) (0.25)
other 0.215 0.305 {0.135 0.301 {0.149 {0.003 0.039
occupation (1.49) (2.09) ({1.61) (1.63) ({1.43) ({0.04) (0.54)
intermediate {0.122 0.109 {0.025 0.378 0.114 0.061 0.041
education ({1.15) (1.11) ({0.40) (3.39) (1.62) (1.19) (0.76)
higher {0.107 0.263 {0.065 0.662 0.113 0.176 0.176
education ({0.79) (2.23) ({0.79) (5.33) (1.25) (2.62) (2.53)
couples 0.064 {0.045 0.776 {0.153 0.370 0.531 0.489
(0.41) ({0.29) (8.38) ({1.00) (3.48) (7.03) (6.22)
divorced or {0.077 {0.334 0.299 {0.258 0.268 0.184 0.095
widowed ({0.43) ({1.82) (2.75) ({1.32) (2.10) (2.11) (1.05)
number of 0.185 0.053 0.061 {0.057 0.036 0.085 0.076
children (4.17) (1.32) (2.38) ({1.33) (1.27) (3.97) (3.42)
intercept {2.063 {5.505 {2.330 {3.704 {2.582
({4.86) ({9.85) ({8.72) ({7.01) ({7.63)
ordered probits:
cut{o 1 1.571 1.946
cut{o 2 3.402 3.977
cut{o 3 4.690 5.625
cut{o 4 5.838 6.647
cut{o 5 6.715
Log Likelihood {560.3 {670.1 {1827.9 {592.0 {1365.6 {3360.5 {2844.5
Pseudo R2 0.602 0.193 0.140 0.182 0.087 0.170 0.214
mean dep. var. 0.829 0.076 0.468 0.063 0.190 1.626 1.436
note: t{values in parentheses
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Table 5a: Estimation results model (11), (12), (15), and (16)
data: housing wealth and nancial wealth, logs
housing wealth selection equation nancial wealth selection equation
constant 10.400 {3.866 8.712 0.646
(9.30) ({3.82) (3.48) (0.75)
log (income+1) {0.237 {0.347 {0.586 0.073
({0.97) ({2.36) ({0.97) (0.55)
log2 (income+1) 0.020 0.024 0.060 {0.004
(1.37) (2.03) (1.61) ({0.33)
marginal tax rate 0.678 3.050 1.881 1.545
(3.08) (7.61) (3.16) (3.10)
age of head 0.053 0.210 {0.072 {0.023
(1.75) (3.84) ({0.97) ({0.47)
age squared / 1000 {0.868 {3.812 1.625 0.662
({1.46) ({3.44) (1.03) (0.66)
age cubed / 10000 0.047 0.228 {0.064 {0.050
(1.27) (3.24) ({0.61) ({0.77)
intermed. education 0.046 0.127 0.098 0.033
(1.42) (1.96) (1.05) (0.42)
high education 0.133 0.194 0.187 0.001
(3.44) (2.09) (1.55) (0.01)
selfemployed/farmer 0.262 0.314 0.341 {0.079
(5.70) (2.84) (2.18) ({0.64)
white collar 0.060 0.165 {0.076 0.248
(1.60) (2.29) ({0.70) (2.76)
other occ. status 0.036 0.124 0.262 0.282
(0.64) (1.21) (1.84) (2.77)
part{time work 0.110 {0.273 {0.373 {0.131
(1.81) ({2.10) ({2.28) ({0.95)
other status {0.030 {0.324 {0.423 {0.281
({0.63) ({3.28) ({3.43) ({2.77)
female 0.038 {0.119 {0.141 0.217
(0.81) ({1.11) ({1.01) (2.20)
couple 0.252 0.412 0.056 0.198
(4.65) (3.81) (0.37) (1.80)
divorced / widowed 0.206 0.024 {0.234 {0.345
(3.49) (0.20) ({1.41) ({2.99)
number of children 0.024 0.041 {0.067 0.152
(1.76) (1.40) ({1.57) (4.88)
house price index 0.334 {0.453 0.397 {0.829
(3.85) ({2.76) (1.67) ({4.34)
note: t{values in parentheses;
see table 1 for the reference groups for the dummy variables:
low education, blue collar worker, full time employed, male, and single
continued on next page
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Table 5a: continued
housing wealth selection equation nancial wealth selection equation
 0.446 1.0 1.679 1.0












number of obs. 3077
note: t{values in parentheses
LM test: H0 : 11 = 22 = 12 = 21 = 0 : 5:61; 
2
4(0:95) = 9:49
Table 5b: Model performance
selection model (16)
data: housing wealth and nancial wealth, logs
no. obs. housing n. assets
reg. data model data model data model
(a) 1364 1360 11.87 11.87 8.73 8.77
(0.50) (0.51) (1.74) (1.81)
(b) 127 127 11.83 11.81 0 0
(0.65) (0.52) (0) (0)
(c) 1214 1221 0 0 7.86 7.90
(0) (0) (1.87) (1.82)
(d) 372 369 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
note: means and standard deviations (in parentheses);
note for tables 5b, 5c, 6b, 6c, 7{10: simulations based on 100 random draws
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Table 5c: Model performance by income quintile
selection model (16)
data: housing wealth and nancial wealth, logs
data model
income cond. cond. cond. cond.
quintile nobs mean stddv nobs mean stddv
1st h 87 11.52 0.58 102 11.54 0.48
f 443 7.36 2.13 471 7.56 1.84
2nd h 200 11.69 0.54 196 11.63 0.47
f 470 8.15 1.76 455 8.03 1.79
3rd h 321 11.71 0.47 330 11.77 0.47
f 533 8.29 1.54 540 8.28 1.76
4th h 382 11.86 0.41 373 11.88 0.47
f 558 8.54 1.69 535 8.56 1.76
5th h 501 12.11 0.47 486 12.09 0.49
f 574 9.03 1.81 580 9.15 1.80
rows labeled h: housing wealth for houseowners
rows labeled f : nancial wealth for n. asset holders
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Table 6a: Estimation results model (11), (12), (15), and (16)
data: housing equity and nancial equity, logs
housing equity selection equation nancial equity selection equation
constant 14.148 {3.930 18.685 {0.224
(0.79) ({3.80) (1.25) ({0.24)
log (income+1) {1.110 {0.343 {0.626 0.049
({0.26) ({2.30) ({0.18) (0.36)
log2 (income+1) 0.118 0.024 0.015 0.005
(0.46) (1.98) (0.07) (0.34)
marginal tax rate {2.484 3.056 1.646 1.265
({1.12) (7.65) (0.74) (2.35)
age of head {0.302 0.213 {0.613 0.024
({0.66) (3.80) ({1.86) (0.46)
age squared / 1000 8.443 {3.865 13.366 {0.340
(0.85) ({3.42) (1.84) ({0.32)
age cubed / 10000 {0.585 0.231 {0.766 0.011
({0.84) (3.22) ({1.51) (0.16)
intermed. education 0.056 0.123 0.006 {0.031
(0.17) (1.88) (0.02) ({0.38)
high education 0.524 0.189 0.107 {0.079
(1.16) (2.05) (0.25) ({0.70)
selfemployed/farmer 0.020 0.315 0.480 {0.037
(0.04) (2.86) (0.84) ({0.28)
white collar {0.815 0.167 {0.658 0.342
({1.95) (2.30) ({1.64) (3.55)
other occ. status 0.254 0.120 0.314 0.270
(0.19) (1.18) (0.50) (2.50)
part{time work 0.776 {0.271 {1.765 {0.152
(0.61) ({2.07) ({3.14) ({1.06)
other status {0.343 {0.322 {1.322 {0.182
({0.47) ({3.24) ({2.44) ({1.70)
female {0.346 {0.116 1.705 0.087
({0.51) ({1.08) (2.84) (0.83)
couple 1.327 0.418 0.305 0.143
(2.61) (3.79) (0.54) (1.22)
divorced / widowed 1.376 0.026 {1.740 {0.319
(1.71) (0.22) ({2.52) ({2.63)
number of children 0.130 0.041 {0.174 0.183
(0.69) (1.36) ({1.20) (5.71)
house price index {0.705 {0.454 {1.443 {0.656
({0.77) ({2.72) ({1.65) ({3.28)
note: t{values in parentheses
continued on next page
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Table 6a: continued
housing equity selection equation nancial equity selection equation
 4.124 1.0 6.096 1.0












number of obs. 3077
note: t{values in parentheses
LM test: H0 : 11 = 22 = 12 = 21 = 0 : 8:21; 
2
4(0:95) = 9:49
Table 6b: Model performance
selection model (16)
data: housing equity and nancial equity, logged
no. obs. housing n. equity
reg. data model data model data model
(a) 1381 1386 10.04 10.01 6.34 6.40
(4.34) (4.31) (6.38) (6.28)
(b) 100 101 10.16 10.33 0 0
(3.94) (4.39) (0) (0)
(c) 1295 1293 0 0 5.49 5.55
(0) (0) (6.15) (6.26)
(d) 301 297 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
note: means and standard deviations (in parentheses);
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Table 6c: Model performance by income quintile
selection model (16)
data: housing equity and nancial equity, logs
data model
income cond. cond. cond. cond.
quintile nobs mean stddv nobs mean stddv
1st h 87 11.30 0.74 102 10.37 4.39
f 475 5.71 5.29 500 6.01 6.36
2nd h 200 10.40 3.66 196 10.10 4.36
f 488 6.28 5.63 474 6.16 6.31
3rd h 321 9.18 5.19 330 9.70 4.32
f 557 5.66 6.45 558 5.80 6.26
4th h 382 9.83 4.49 373 9.82 4.27
f 566 6.47 6.05 551 5.88 6.24
5th h 501 10.37 4.12 486 10.32 4.30
f 592 5.49 7.55 595 6.12 6.25
rows labeled h: housing equity for houseowners
rows labeled f : nancial equity for n. asset holders
Table 7: impact of threshold variation
data: housing wealth and nancial wealth, logs
housing wealth nancial wealth
ownersh. cond. mean ownersh. cond. mean
data 48.46 11.87 83.78 8.31
model no change 48.31 11.87 83.88 8.36
simulation change of {1% 52.65 11.86 83.81 8.38
housing {2% 56.99 11.85 83.74 8.39
threshold by {5% 69.21 11.82 83.58 8.44
change of {1% 48.31 11.87 85.63 8.35
n. wealth {2% 48.31 11.87 87.26 8.35
threshold by {5% 48.31 11.87 91.30 8.34
31
Table 8: impact of threshold variation
data: housing equity and nancial equity, logs
housing equity nancial equity
ownersh. cond. mean ownersh. cond. mean
data 48.46 10.04 87.03 5.92
model no change 48.31 10.03 87.07 5.99
simulation change of {1% 53.82 10.02 86.84 6.04
housing {2% 59.30 10.01 86.65 6.09
threshold by {5% 74.15 9.97 86.17 6.22
change of {1% 48.30 10.04 90.35 6.00
n. equity {2% 48.30 10.04 93.03 6.00
threshold by {5% 48.29 10.04 97.66 6.01
Table 9: impact of price variation
data: housing wealth and nancial wealth, logs
housing wealth nancial wealth
ownersh. cond. mean ownersh. cond. mean renters
data 48.46 11.87 83.78 8.31 5.87
model no change 48.31 11.87 83.88 8.36 6.06
simulation house price {20% 51.00 11.80 87.24 8.29 6.31
change of {15% 50.34 11.81 86.46 8.30 6.25
{10% 49.67 11.83 85.64 8.32 6.19
+10% 46.95 11.90 82.02 8.40 5.93
+15% 46.28 11.92 81.02 8.41 5.85
+20% 45.64 11.94 79.99 8.43 5.77
Table 10: impact of price variation
data: housing equity and nancial equity, logs
housing equity nancial equity
ownersh. cond. mean ownersh. cond. mean renters
data 48.46 10.04 87.03 5.92 4.35
model no change 48.31 10.03 87.07 5.99 4.51
simulation house price {20% 51.01 10.17 89.29 6.29 4.90
change of {15% 50.32 10.13 88.77 6.22 4.80
{10% 49.68 10.10 88.21 6.14 4.71
+10% 46.96 9.97 85.83 5.84 4.32
+15% 46.29 9.94 85.20 5.76 4.22
+20% 45.65 9.90 84.54 5.69 4.12
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Appendix
In this appendix we address coherency of the empirical model. To simplify notation, we set p1
and p2 equal to one. For ease of exposition, we rst assume that the thresholds are zero, i.e.
the case of non{negativity constraints. The model we consider is thus given by
(a) q1 > 0; q

2 > 0 :
q1 = q

1; q2 = q

2
(b) ~q1 > 0; q

2 < 0 :




2; q2 = 0
(c) q1 < 0; ~q2 > 0 :





(d) ~q1 < 0; ~q2 < 0 :
q1 = 0; q2 = 0:
(17)
(12) implies that the (q1 ; q

2) follows a continuous distribution with support R
2. Coherency
therefore means that the set of (q1; q

2) which yield zero or more than one solutions of (17)
should have measure zero. Sixteen cases can be distinguished, according to whether q1 , q

2, ~q1,
and ~q2 are positive or negative. Twelve cases lead to exactly one solution, for one of the four
regimes (a)  (d). In four cases, the solution is either non{unique or non{existent:
{ If q1 > 0, q

2 > 0, ~q1 < 0, and ~q2 < 0, regimes (a) as well as (d) would yield a solution.
{ If q1 < 0, q

2 < 0, ~q1 > 0, and ~q2 > 0, (b) as well as (c) yield a solution.
{ If q1 > 0, q

2 < 0, ~q1 < 0, and ~q2 > 0 or
{ if q1 < 0, q

2 > 0, ~q1 > 0, and ~q2 < 0, none of the regimes leads to a solution.
Coherency thus means that 1 and 2 must be such that these four cases do not occur. These
four cases are those for which both q1 and ~q1 and q

2 and ~q2 have dierent signs.
Proposition: Model (17) is coherent if and only if 12  1.
Proof: Suppose the model is not coherent. Then the argument given above implies that there
are q1 , q







































For the reverse implication, assume that 12 > 1. Distinguish two cases: 1 > 0 and 2 > 0

















q1 has nonzero measure. This is the
set for which q1 > 0, q

2 < 0, ~q1 < 0, and ~q2 > 0. Thus the model is incoherent. Similarly, for
the other case (1 < 0 and 2 < 0), the set with q

1 > 0, q

2 > 0, ~q1 < 0, and ~q2 < 0 has nonzero
measure. Thus 12 > 1 implies incoherency. This completes the proof. 
Now consider the case with thresholds. If we use (14) and rewrite the model as (15) and (16),
the coherency requirement remains exactly the same as above. Just replace qi by S

i (i = 1; 2).




















~Si as in (15), the regime allocation equations
for this model are given by
(a) S1 > 0; S

2 > 0
(b) ~S1 + (1   1)T

2 > 0; S

2 < 0
(c) S1 < 0;
~S2+ (2   2)T

1 > 0
(d) ~S1 + (1   1)T

2 < 0;




As before, we can distinguish 16 cases, according to the signs of S1 , S

2 ,
~S1 + (1   1)T

2 , and
~S2 + (2   2)T 1 . To guarantee a unique solution, 1, 2, 1 and 2 should be such that the
four cases are excluded for which the signs of S1 and
~S1 + (1   1)T 2 , as well as the signs of
S2 and
~S2 + (2   2)T

1 are dierent. The main dierence with the situation we had before,
however, is that these quantities are not determined by two but by four latent variables. It






2 ) equals R
4. Then coherency can
only be obtained if 1 = 1 or 2 = 2. This shows that a substantially more general model
than the one dened by (14) cannot be obtained. For example, the intuitively attractive model






























Figure 3: marginal distributions
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Figure 4: asset ownership by age
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Figure 5: wealth holding by age
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